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NOTES AND COMMENTS
in an action for support.20  In both actions, if the foreign decree is
pleaded as a defense, the court may inquire into the jurisdiction of the
foreign court.2
1
The deserted spouse may also resort to the declaratory judgment,
requesting the court to determine the marital status of the parties. If
it is successfully proved that the plaintiff in the divorce action was not
domiciled at the divorce forum the court will adjudge the foreign divorce
decree null and void.22  That a declaratory judgment is an appropriate
remedy seems well settled today2 3  In such a case there is an actual
controversy as one spouse asserts that the foreign divorce is valid and
the other contends that it is not.2 4 Both have an interest in the marital
status; and if the deserted spouse does not wish a divorce or support,
there is no adequate remedy at law.25 Thus, the action will settle the
status and terminate the controversy.
2 6
These remedies seem to afford the non-appearing defendant in a
foreign divorce suit adequate protection of his or her marital status
and property rights. Reasonably prompt action would prevent the re-
sult of the principal case.
ROBERT M. WILEY.
Federal Courts-Civil Rights Act-Stay of State
Criminal Proceedings
In 1793, Congress, apprehending the danger of encroachment by fed-
eral courts upon the jurisdiction of state courts, passed a statute pro-
hibiting the enjoining of proceedings in state courts by courts of the
United States.' This statute, with but one amendment, 2 remained
" White v. White, 150 F. 2d 157 (D. C. Cir. 1945) ; Evans v. Evans, 149 F.
2d 831 (D. C. Cir. 1945) ; Atkins v. Atkins, 386 Ill. 345, 54 N. E. 2d 488 (1945);
Phelps v. Phelps, 154 Pa. Super. 270, 35 A. 2d 530 (1944).2 Note, 157 A. L. R. 1399 (1945).
" Mills v. Mills, 119 Conn. 612, 179 AtI. 5 (1935) ; Hogan v. Hogan, 320 Mass.
658, 70 N. E. 2d 821 (1947) ; Lawler v. Lawler, 2 N. J. 527, 66 A. 2d 855 (Sup.
Ct. 1949) ; Henry v. Henry, 140 N. J. Eq. 21, 144 Atl. 18 (Ch. 1928) ; Lowe v.
Lowe, 265 N. Y. 197, 192 N. E. 291 (1934); Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y.
382, 165 N. E. 819 (1929); Altholy v. Altholy, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 143 (Sup. Ct.
1947); Smerda v. Smerda, 74 N. E. 2d 751 (Ohio 1947); Melnick v. Melnick,
147 Pa. Super. 564, 25 A. 2d 111 (1942); BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
478 (2d ed. 1941) ; see Jacobs, The Utility of Injunctions and Declaratory Judg-
inents in Migratory Divorce, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 370, 391 (1935).
BORcHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 479 (2d ed. 1941).
24 Melnick v. Melnick, 147 Pa. Super. 564, 25 A. 2d 111 (1942).
"Henry v. Henry, 140 N. J. Eq. 21, 144 Atl. 18 (Ch. 1928) ; Melnick v. Mel-
nick, 147 Pa. Super. 564, 25 A. 2d 111 (1942).
" Hogan v. Hogan, 320 Mass. 658, 70 N. E. 2d 821 (1947).
S,. . .nor shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any
court of a state." Act of March 2, 1793, c. 22, §5, 1 STAT. 334 (1793), as
amended, REv. STAT. §720 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §379 (1926), 62 STAT. 968, 28
U. S. C. §2283 (1948). This statute has been held not to be jurisdictional, but
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basically unchanged until 1948. In the intervening period, however,
many judicial exceptions were made as to its applicability.8 In 1941,
the case of Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co.4 disapproved several of
these court made exceptions and expressly overruled one of them.5
Also, Congress has enacted exceptions to the "anti-injunction" statute,
by other acts which expressly provide in specific instances, for stay of
state court proceedings. 6 These Congressional exceptions were recog-
nized and approved in the Toucey case.
As a result of the Toucey case, Congress amended the "anti-
injunction" statute when the new Judicial Code was enacted in 1948.
The new Act reads:
"A court of the United States may not grant an injunction
to stay proceedings in a state court except (1) as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or (2) where necessary in aid
of its jurisdiction, or (3) to protect or effectuate its judgments." 7
The first exception is merely Congressional recognition of the long
standing, unquestioned, legislative exceptions and had no real effect on
the existing law; but the latter two exceptions were inserted to reinstate
the judicial exceptions questioned or overruled by the Toucey case.,
In the recent case of Cooper v. Hutchinson,9 a novel question deal-
ing with the application of the "anti-injunction" statute was presented.
Cooper was tried and convicted of murder by a county court in New
Jersey, being represented at trial by court appointed counsel. Between
merely as going to the question of whether there is equity in a particular bill.
Smith v. Apple, 264 U. S. 274, 279 (1924).21,. . . except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law
relating to proceedings in bankruptcy." REv. STAT. §720 (1875).
'The authorities are not all in accord as to the classification of these ex-
ceptions, but generally they are: (1) The res cases, where the jurisdiction of a
federal court has attached to the subject matter of a particular action, an in-
junction will lie to prevent any other court from taking jurisdiction over the
same subject matter. (2) The ancillary cases, where the injunction would be
granted as ancillary to other relief being sought. (3) The cases in which fed-
eral courts have enjoined the enforcement of void or fraudulent judgments obtained
in a state court. (4) The refitigation cases, where injunctions are granted against
state court actions which seek to relitigate the same issue decided in the federal
court. See generally Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U. S. 118 (1941) ;
Barrett, Federal linjuction Against Proceedings in State Courts, 35 CALIF. L.
REv. 545 (1947).
"314 U. S. 118 (1941). Notes, 27 CORNELL L. Q. 270 (1942), 27 IowA L. REV.
652 (1942), 26 MINN. L. REv. 558 (1942).
'The relitigation cases were overruled and doubt was cast on all other ex-
ceptions to the "anti-injunction" statute except the res cases.
' See notes 19, 20, and 21 infra; MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE U. S. JUDICIAL
CODE 10.03 (49) p. 396 (1949).
62 STAT. 968, 28 U. S. C. §2283 (1948) (numbers supplied).
'See 28 U. S. C. A. §2283, Reviser's notes (1948) ; Mangan, Federal Legis-
lation, The Judicial Code of 1948, 37 GEo. LAW J. 394, 396 (1949) ; MOORE, COM-
MENTARY ON TEE U. S. JUDICIAL CODE 10.03(49) p. 410 (1949).
' 184 F. 2d 119 (3rd Cir. 1950).
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trial and appeal he secured the services of two New Jersey attorneys
and three New York attorneys. The latter were admitted pro hac vice
in the Supreme Court of New Jersey and later in the county court.
Upon reversal of the conviction, the attorneys proceeded in the county
court with various preliminary matters incident to the new trial. Be-
fore the new trial commenced, the trial judge, without a hearing, entered
an order depriving the New York attorneys of further authority to
appear in the case. There was no charge of misconduct. Cooper, the
accused, then filed this action in the federal district court seeking to
enjoin the trial judge from proceeding further with the case until the
New York attorneys were recognized. The accused charged that he
had been deprived of rights guaranteed by the fifth,10 sixth,11 and four-
teenth'12 amendments of the Constitution, and that such was a violation
of the Civil Rights Act.' 3  Upon dismissal of the complaint, 14 appeal
was taken to the Court of Appeals.
The court refused to pass upon the constitutional questions raised,
deferring them until the New Jersey Supreme Court had an oppor-
tunity to act. However, the court did pass upon the problem raised by
the plaintiff as to the Civil Rights Act and held the Act to be an express
exception to the "anti-injunction" statute, thus implying that injunction
would be proper if the court found it necessary.
Assuming the action of the trial judge violated the aforementioned
constitutional rights, which would necessarily violate the Civil Rights
Act, the case raises two interesting questions.
(1) Does the Civil Rights Act authorize stay of state court proceed-
ings in case of violation of its provisions?
The decision in the instant case cites no authority in support of its
position on this point, and a diligent search indicates that this is the
only federal appellate court which has so held. In several cases decided
in the old circuit courts, this issue was raised and in each case the court
held the Civil Rights Act did iwt in any way modify the "anti-injunction"
10 U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. V, "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law. .. "
11 U. S. CoxsT. AMEND. VI, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
1' U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV §1, ". . . No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. .. ."
1" "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." REv. STAT.
§1979 (1875), 8 U. S. C. §43 (1942).
14 Cooper v. Hutchinson, 88 F. Supp. 774 (D. N. J. 1950).
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statute.15  Further, in the Toucey case, Justice Frankfurter listed the
statutes which were express authorizations for stay of state court pro-
ceedings, and no mention was made of the Civil Rights Act.' 0
The Act was passed to provide a method of enforcing the provisions
of the Constitution, mainly the rights guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment.1 7  It would seem that if the Act had been considered an
express exception to the "anti-injunction" statute, it would have been
raised in those cases where the court refused to enjoin unconstitutional
proceedings in a state court because of the "anti-injunction" statute.
It has never been so used.18
The Civil Rights Act provides that a violator "... shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress." Comparing this with the terms of the other
acts declared to be express exceptions to the "anti-injunction" statute,
it becomes obvious that no such construction was intended of the Civil
Rights Act. For instance, the original Interpleader Act provided that
"notwithstanding any provisions of the Judicial Code to the contrary,
said . . . court shall have the power . . . to issue an order . . . enjoin-
ing them from instituting or prosecuting any suit or prosecuting any
suit or proceeding in any state court."'19 Another reads: ". . . all claims
" Aultman & Taylor Co. v. Brumfield, 102 Fed. 7 (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1900),
appeal dismissed, 22 Sup. Ct. 938 (1901). This case also disapproved a dictum
in Touchman v. Welch, 42 Fed. 548, 557 (C. C. D. Kan. 1890) which expressed
the opinion that the Civil Rights Act was an exception to the "anti-injunction"
statute. Hemsley v. Meyers, 45 Fed. 283 (C. C. D. Kan. 1891). Cf. International
Longshoremen's & Ware. Union v. Ackerman, 82 F. Supp. 65 (D. Hawaii 1948),
where an injunction against pending criminal proceedings in the territorial court
was issued, based upon, among other things, the Civil Rights Act. Evidently
there was no appeal from this decision. In a later case decided by the Court of
Appeals, Alesna v. Rice, 172 F. 2d 176 (9th Cir. 1949), in which an injunction
was sought against a territorial court of Hawaii, the injunction was refused, the
court stating "Nor does the complaint allege any of the facts which the decision
of the District Court found in (the Ackerman case)." This seems to be a "back
handed" approval of the Ackerman decision.
. Also, no leading article on the subject has mentioned the Civil Rights Act
when listing the Congressional exceptions. See MooRE, COMMENTARY ON THE
U. S. JUDICIAL CODE 110.03(49) p. 410; Barrett, Federal Injunction Against Pro-
ceedings in State Courts, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 545, 559 (1947).
"' See Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U. S. 496, 510 (1938).
"lI re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200 (1888); cf. Douglass v. City of Jeanette, 319
U. S. 157, rehearing denied, 319 U. S. 782 (1943); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U. S.
496 (1938).
"Interpleader Act of 1926, 44 STAT. 416 (1926), amending the Interpleader
Act of 1917, 39 STAT. 927 (1917). This provision was retained in the Interpleader
Act of 1936, 49 STAT. 1096, 28 U. S. C. §41 (26) (1936). See Treinies v. Sunshine
Mining Co., 308 U. S. 66, 74 (1939). In the new Judicial Code the wording was
changed. Since the "anti-inj unction" statute had been amended, there was no
"provision of the Judicial Code to the contrary." The Act now reads: ". . . a
district court may issue its ... order restraining (the claimants) from instituting
or prosecuting any proceeding in any State . . . court. . . ." 62 STAT. 970, 28
U. S. C. §2361 (1949) ; see 28 U. S. C. A. §2361, Reviser's note (1949).
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and proceedings . . . shall cease" ;20 and others have similar wording
clearly indicating than an exception was intended. 21
It is true that injunction has been used in many cases to prevent
enforcement of unconstitutional state statutes or city ordinances, or to
restrain the enforcemen t of valid acts in an unconstitutional manner.
The Civil Rights Act has formed the basis for such action.2 2 But, it is
to be noted that in these cases no proceedings had been instituted and
therefore such action did not come within the purview of the "anti-
injunction" statute.3
It thus seems that the court's position is rather tenuous in holding
that the Civil Rights Act constitutes an express exception to the "anti-
injunction" statute.
(2) Is it ever proper for a federal court to enjoin criminal proceed-
ings in a state court, once the proceedings have been instituted?
This question has presented itself almost exclusively in cases where
injunction was sought to restrain prosecution under an alleged uncon-
stitutional state statute or city ordinance,2 4 or, as in the principal case,
where acts of state officers are alleged to be unconstitutional. 25 Few
of these cases have mentioned the "anti-injunction" statute,26 most being
decided upon general rules of equity practice.
The equitable rule, as often stated, is that courts of equity do not
ordinarily restrain criminal prosecutions. This rule is limited by two
exceptions: first, criminal proceedings will be enjoined when irreparable
injury to property is threatened; and second, criminal proceedings will
" Limitation on shipowners liability, based on the Act of 1851, 9 STAT. 635
(1851). See Providence & N. Y. S. S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U. S. 578, 599
(1883).
"Frazier-Lemke Act, 47 STAT. 1473 (1933), 11 U. S. C. §203 (1940) "... the
following proceedings shall not be instituted, or if instituted . . . , shall not be
maintained, in any court... ."; Emergency Price Control Act, 56 STAT. 23 (1942),
50 U. S. C. App. §925 (1944) ". .. he may make application to the appropriate
court for an order enjoining such acts or practices ....
-" See Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U. S. 157, rehearing denied, 319 U. S.
782 (1943) ; Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U. S. 496 (1938).
-a See note 26 infra. 13 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE §6676 (2d ed.19414).194x parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908); Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387
(1940) ; Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1940); Spielman Motor Sales
Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89 (1934); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266
U. S. 497 (1924).
- Essanay Film Mfg. Co. v. Kane, 258 U. S. 358 (1922) ; Reagan v. Farmers
Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362 (1894).
2 The issue has been raised in the following cases, and in each case the court
held that the statute applied to criminal proceedings which were actually pending
in the state courts, but not to those which were threatened. Jewel Tea Co. v.
Lee's Summit, Mo., 198 Fed. 532, 539 (D. C. Mo. 1912), aff'd, 217 Fed. 965
(8th Cir. 1914); Kansas City Gas Co. v. Kansas City, 198 Fed. 500, 525 (D. C.
Mo. 1912); St. Louis & S. F. R.R. v. Allen, 181 Fed. 710, 722 (C. C. D. Ark.
1910).
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be enjoined when an equity action is pending, and the criminal action
is commenced by one of the parties to the equity action to determine
the same right that is in issue in the equity action.27  Both appear, on
the surface, to be exceptions to the "anti-injunction" statute as well as
to the equitable rule, and such is the opinion of at least one writer.28
However, a close examination of the cases will reveal that only the sec-
ond can accurately be so classified.
The first exception concerns, in reality, a question of what consti-
tutes a proceeding in a state court. In stating this exception to the
rule, the courts have failed, in most cases, to differentiate between
threatened proceedings and pending proceedings. As a practical matter,
however, the word 'proceeding" as used in this connection contemplates
threatened proceedings. Thus, courts have scrupulously avoided enjoin-
ing criminal proceedings which were actually pending in a state court,
unless the case came within the second exception. Strict adherence to
this equitable policy has made unnecessary resort to the "anti-injunction"
statute.
30
The second exception to the equitable rule is not inconsistent with
the provisions of the "anti-injunction" statute. Prior to the passage of
the amended statute, federal courts could enjoin state court proceed-
ings which sought to exercise jurisdiction over persons or things, over
which the federal court had already acquired jurisdiction.31 This rule,
" Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 143 (1923).
'8 Barrett, Federal Injunction Against Proceedings in State Courts, 35 CALIF.
L. REv. 545, 551 (1947). The author does, however, make a distinction between
pending actions and threatened actions, treating only the latter as an exception to
the "anti-injunction" statute. See also Warren, Federal and State Court Intcr-ference, 43 HARv. L. REv. 345, 375 (1930).
"Looney v. Eastern Texas R.R., 247 U. S. 214, 221 (1917) ; Prout v. Starr,
188 U. S. 537, 544 (1902).
" In Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445 (1927), injunction was granted
against threatened prosecutions under an unconstitutional state statute, but the
court refused to enjoin a proceeding which had been instituted. The court quoted
Ex parte Young 209 U. S. 123 (1908) in support ("But the federal court cannot,
of course, interfere in a case where the proceedings were already pending in a
state court."), and disapproved a dictum in Davis & Farnum Co. v. Los Angeles,
189 U. S. 207 (1903) which stated a contrary view. Accord, Caldwell v. Sioux
Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U. S. 559 (1917). See Note, 10 MINN. L. REV. 153(1926). Contra, International Longshoremen's & Ware. Union v. Ackerman, 82
F. Supp. 65 (D. C. Hawaii 1948).
" As to "things" there has never been any controversy, this being the so-called
res exception, recognized as valid by the Toicey case; but as to "persons" there
has been a divergence of authority. If the "person" is under the authority of a
court of another jurisdiction, then this is also an exception. Ponzi v. Fessenden,
258 U. S. 254 (1922). But if a mere right or liability between persons is con-
cerned, a different question is presented. In the Toucey case it was said that the
"first come, first served" doctrine of cases similar to Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S.
537 (1902) was discarded by Mine v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U. S. 226 (1922)
where it was held that mere in personam actions did not come within this ex-
ception. These cases are the "ancilliary" cases which were questioned by the
Toucey case, and later incorporated into the amended act. See note 32 infra.
[Vol. 29
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expressly incorporated in the amended act,32 thus includes the second
exception to the equitable rule.
Since the instant case is not of the latter type, and as the criminal
proceedings had already been instituted, the inference of the court that
it could enjoin the proceedings violates the provisions of the "anti-
injunction" statute as well as the long standing equitable doctrine.
Nevertheless, the court's action in Cooper v. Hutchinson, in refus-
ing to grant injunction, and in remanding to the district court pending
a ruling by the state court on the constitutional issues was not detri-
mental to either party. It did not delay the state's administration of
criminal justice, and resulted in disposition of the case without necessity
of appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court.3 3 This is not the first
time such relief has been employed, 34 and it appears that it is to be
preferred to dismissal or an order enjoining the court proceedings where
the propriety of injunction is questionable.
RICHARD DEY. MANNING.
Liens-Priority of Federal Claims Over Attachments
A creditor brought an action on an unsecured promissory note and
on the same day attached four parcels of real estate belonging to the
debtor to secure payment of any judgment recovered in the action. After
levy of the attachment, which was duly recorded, a federal tax lien' on
all of the debtor's property, including the previously attached real estate,
was recorded. Subsequently, the creditor recovered judgment in his
action on the promissory note. In a suit to determine priority of liens
on the real property, a California district appellate court found that
the attachment was a specific and perfected lien, and following the gen-
eral rule of "first in time of recordation, first in priority," the attach-
ment was superior to the federal tax lien.2  The California Supreme
Court declined to hear the case and the United State Supreme Court
granted certiorari. By a unanimous vote, the Supreme Court held that
the federal tax lien was superior to the contingent or inchoate attach-
321"... except . . . where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction. . . ." 62 STAT.
968, 28 U. S. C. §2283 (1948).
" Following the decision of the instant case, the trial judge issued a rule to
show cause to the parties involved. This was never heard, as the three New York
attorneys voluntarily requested permission to withdraw from the case, which per-
mission was granted.
" Railroad Comm. of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941) (first case
in which this type of relief used) ; A. F. of L. v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582 (1946);
Specter Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101 (1944).
' INT. Rrv. CODE §§3670-3672.
'Winther v. Morrison, 93 Cal. App. 2d 608, 209 P. 2d 657 (1949).
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